Politics China misjudged its pressure campaign against Japan

[thomas]

Interesting editorial by Nikkei Asia: senior editorial writer Nakazawa Katsuji argues that the Chinese government has miscalculated its policy toward Japan, specifically the retaliation against PM Takaichi, leaving China's leading state-owned media outlets hesitant to report on Japan's newly formed opposition party, the CRA (Centrist Reform Alliance セントリスト改革連合).


China misread the effects of its pressure on Japan, especially its criticism of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi over her comments on Taiwan. Beijing seems to have believed her political support was weak and that continued attacks would make her back down. Instead, the strategy has backfired, boosting her popularity and prompting her to call a snap election for the lower house.

At the same time, China's approach has complicated its own media strategy. State-run outlets have mainly avoided reporting on Japan's newly formed opposition bloc, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), despite its significance in domestic politics. The CRA was created by the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and Komeito as a counterweight to Takaichi's ruling coalition. Still, its foreign and security policies have turned out to be far tougher on China than Beijing expected.

Both the ruling camp and the new opposition alliance now advocate firm responses to Chinese pressure while maintaining Japan's security framework, including acceptance of the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security. The CRA's stance marks a clear shift from earlier opposition positions. It draws on experience with Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, including disputes over the Senkaku Islands.

As a result, China's efforts to play on divisions in Japanese politics have had little effect. With elections approaching, both the ruling and opposition camps have converged mainly on one point: standing firm against China has become an effective political stance, reducing Beijing's influence more than expected.

Paywall alert:

Analysis: Repercussions mount from China's Japan strategy

With Japan polls looming, a new centrist party vows to stand firm against China

asia.nikkei.com

 

[mdchachi]

Isn't calling for an election a sign of weakness? Or does she feel she's in a strong position to thus it's better to call for an election earlier? I've never really understood this aspect of parliamentary governments.

 

[thomas]

Isn't calling for an election a sign of weakness?

On the contrary! Currently, her approval ratings are well over 60% (according to some surveys, over 70%), and she hopes to convert temporary popularity into parliamentary seats before conditions become less favourable.

 

[mdchachi]

On the contrary! Currently, her approval ratings are well over 60% (according to some surveys, over 70%), and she hopes to convert temporary popularity into parliamentary seats before conditions become less favourable.

So the rule of thumb is to call for an election when you're feeling strong then? And presumably there is some deadline so even if you're not doing well you can't postpone the election indefinitely?

 

[Lothor]

So the rule of thumb is to call for an election when you're feeling strong then? And presumably there is some deadline so even if you're not doing well you can't postpone the election indefinitely?

That's right. It favours the ruling party and encourages short-term policies to curry favour with voters (such as gaijin-bashing). Political commentary also gets diverted into speculation about when there's going to be an election. The US system is more sensible in that regard.

 

[Hiroyuki Nagashima]

I asked an AI about the approval ratings and policies of successive Japanese administrations, from Kishida to Ishiba to Takaichi.
These are the major approval ratings of recent Japanese administrations (Kishida → Ishiba → Takaichi) and an overview of their trends.

Kishida Cabinet data point plotted around ~26% (average during later term).
Ishiba Cabinet points include a mid-term rise (~44%) and later low (~28.5%).
Takaichi Cabinet initial ratings are notably high (around 63.8–75%).

(Overview of Key Cabinets)

Kishida Cabinet (Fumio Kishida)
Kishida's government experienced a significant decline in approval over its term.
By early 2024, approval was in the mid-20% range after months of low ratings attributed to scandals and economic dissatisfaction.
This low level reflected broad public dissatisfaction over political funding controversies and policy performance.

Ishiba Cabinet (Shigeru Ishiba)
Ishiba's Cabinet began with moderate approval (often around 44–46% early in 2025).
However, support fell into the 20–30% range later in his term, hitting lows around ~28% in some polls.
Public sentiment fluctuated, with some short-term increases and other polls showing even lower levels later in mid-2025.

Takaichi Cabinet (Sanae Takaichi)
Takaichi's administration, inaugurated in late 2025, enjoyed very strong early support, with multiple polls indicating high approval:
~63.8% shortly after formation (Jiji Press).
~71% in public opinion surveys a few days later.
Some polls reported even ~75%+ initial approval (Fuji FNN), one of the highest since the early 2000s.
This strong support is often attributed to a "honeymoon effect" for new leaders and renewed public expectation for policy direction.

Key Trends (Summary)
Early honeymoon boost for new administrations: Newly formed cabinets often see higher approval at the start (e.g., Takaichi's ~60–70%).
Mid-term fluctuations: Approval can rise or fall due to events (political scandals, economic conditions, policy initiatives).
Kishida era saw sustained low support toward its latter half, while Ishiba saw variability with both mid-level and low approval snapshots.
Takaichi's initial support levels are comparatively high, suggesting stronger initial public confidence.

 

[Hiroyuki Nagashima]

岸田内閣の中国政策（2021〜2025年前半）
1) Balancing Diplomacy with Security Concerns

Under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Japan's China policy sought a balance between deterrence and engagement.

The administration maintained that China's growing military power and assertiveness in the region (especially around Taiwan and the East China Sea) was a primary security challenge. Japan thus reinforced its defense posture and alliance with the United States to manage this challenge while still pursuing stable relations.

2) Dialogue and Economic Engagement

Japan continued regular diplomatic and economic communication with China, emphasizing mutual cooperation where possible (trade, cultural exchanges, people-to-people relations). For instance, there were initiatives to resume high-level economic dialogue and enhance exchanges.

3) Strategic Framework: U.S.–Japan Alliance & Indo-Pacific Cooperation

Kishida's China policy was deeply tied to the U.S.–Japan security alliance and broader Indo-Pacific strategy focused on "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) principles. This reflected both shared values and regional security goals, with China perceived as a strategic competitor but also a vital economic partner.

4) Pragmatism amid Complexity

Kishida often aimed for pragmatic diplomacy — acknowledging security tensions but avoiding outright confrontation. His government sought to uphold international norms and rules, while keeping channels open for communication with China.

Summary:
Kishida's China policy blended deterrence and dialogue. It reinforced Japan's security posture vis-à-vis China's growing military assertiveness, strengthened ties with allied democracies (especially the U.S.), and pursued practical cooperation in economics and cultural exchanges — aiming for a stable but cautious bilateral relationship.

石破内閣の中国政策（2024〜2025）
1) Emphasis on "Mutually Beneficial and Constructive Ties"

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's China policy placed a strong rhetorical focus on improving bilateral relations and promoting constructive engagement. He publicly stated his intent to build "mutually beneficial" relationships with China and maintain communication at multiple levels.

2) Practical Diplomacy and Dialogue

Ishiba sought direct avenues for dialogue with Chinese leaders and officials, including plans for high-level visits and discussions. He also discussed easing trade tensions — such as encouraging the resumption of imports of Japanese products (e.g., seafood) that had been restricted.

3) Managing Tension Points

Although advocating improved ties, the Ishiba government still had to confront long-standing bilateral issues, such as territorial tensions, export bans, and conflicting narratives on history and security. At times this led to diplomatic friction — for example, Japan formally protested China's public misrepresentation of Ishiba's comments during a bilateral meeting.

4) Mixed Perceptions

China's state media sometimes described Ishiba's approach as focused on stable cooperation and even welcomed his mutual-benefit language, though external observers noted contradictions in practice (balancing engagement with Japan's security posture).

Summary:
Ishiba's China policy blended diplomatic outreach with practical negotiation efforts. It placed a high priority on dialogue and restoring mutual trust while addressing economic issues and bilateral tensions. However, navigating sensitive political and security disagreements — including public miscommunication incidents — illustrated the challenges of reconciling engagement with national interests.