6 Party talks: state of affairs

Its interesting to assess Christopher Hills recent comment regarding the DPRK's "exhaustive" list of demands presented at the latest round of 6-party talks. He claimed that Washington's patience had "reached its limit" and that "[the DPRK's] future is very much at stake".

The DPRK does not seem to share Washington's perception of the current relative positions though. It seems the "U.S. top nuclear negotiator and his counterpart Kim Kye-gwan were to meet in Beijing on Sunday but Kim never showed up".

Since up until the last round of talks the US had repeatedly turned down the DPRKs requests for bilateral talks, either on the sidelines or separately, Kim's no-show would suggest that the two parties perceived positions have indeed taken quite a turn. The DPRK now believes "no preliminary meeting is necessary and things can be worked out during the six-party talks".

Despite public demonisation by the US, the DPRKs diplomacy of 'brinkmanship' has been a lot more successful than Washington's inconsistent and inflexible approach-as it has been the DPRK's goal to normalise relations with the US right from the start (the 6-party talks being a compromise on Pyongyang's behalf in order to sit down at the table with the US), the fact that the DPRK chooses NOT to meet with the US one-on-one now means that the DPR Koreans must be feeling quite confident. Nevertheless Hill's statement seems to suggest that not much has really changed in regard to the approach of the US-their head is still stuck in the sand.

Chosun Ilbo ("N KOREA FAILS TO SHOW FOR BILATERAL MEETING WITH U.S.", 2006-12-18)
Reuters ("N.KOREA BRINGS LAUNDRY LIST OF DEMANDS TO TALKS", 2006-12-18)

While I think US diplomacy on North Korea for decades has left much to be desired -- it basically amounts to maintaining a strong front and begging China to do something -- I give the Bush administration a lot of credit for sticking to its demand on six party talks.

The trouble caused by North Korea in the region is hardly a bilateral issue with the US. Each of its neighbors is affected in some way by its reckless international behavior, its economic decrepitude, and its horrifying abuse of its own citizens. Accordingly, a bilateral agreement alone woudl not solve the North Korean question, and, if anything, it would drive a wedge between the US and Japan, which would have serious consequences for the region. The Bush administration learned from 1994 that the US cannot reach a separate deal with Pyongyang and dictate it to Japan after the fact, without Japan fearing abandonment (one of the classic poles of alliance politics -- accordingly, in 1994 there was a lot of talk in Japanese security policy circles asking how Japan can ensure its own defense in the face of a potentially unreliable US).

In any event, the bargaining environment is most likely irrelevant, because I don't think it's possible for negotiations to persuade a country that has worked hard to develop nuclear weapons to give them up. The solution to the North Korean question depends on, as always, Beijing, and to a lesser extent Seoul.