- 4 Jun 2006
- 561
- 39
Recently, I read an old article from Naval History (June 2003), investigating the historicity of the "divine wind" that wrecked the Mongol fleet and spared the Japanese from a devastating invasion. The article plumbed into the historiographical nature of the invasion accounts, with some interesting results.
Firstly, the tale of the kamikaze decisively destroying the Mongol fleet has been demonstrated to be of Meiji manufacture. While a storm played a role in sparing the Japanese, other factors were instrumental in the defense of the Japanese islands. The typhoon story was propaganda that gained strength during the Meiji and subsequent Taisho eras. The Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War both helped to strengthen the narrative of the divinely summoned storm, propaganda that assured the Japanese people that the gods themselves would oppose an invasion of Japan.
Secondly, while the storm played an effective role in halting the Mongol assault, a number of other factors aided the Japanese. The Mongol's inability to coordinate a successful offensive and gain a secure foothold on Kyushu played a vital role. The Japanese had prepared for the invasion, and utilized the terrain to great advantage. A 25-mile wall, encircling Hakata Bay, fortified the Mongols' primary landing-zone against incursion, making an amphibious assault extremely difficult. Although the Japanese had constructed a minor navy, it did little more than harass and annoy the Mongol ships, which had fastened their ships together into massive floating fortresses against Japanese assault. It was this action, however, that proved to cripple the Mongol fleet during the typhoon.
Firstly, the tale of the kamikaze decisively destroying the Mongol fleet has been demonstrated to be of Meiji manufacture. While a storm played a role in sparing the Japanese, other factors were instrumental in the defense of the Japanese islands. The typhoon story was propaganda that gained strength during the Meiji and subsequent Taisho eras. The Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War both helped to strengthen the narrative of the divinely summoned storm, propaganda that assured the Japanese people that the gods themselves would oppose an invasion of Japan.
Secondly, while the storm played an effective role in halting the Mongol assault, a number of other factors aided the Japanese. The Mongol's inability to coordinate a successful offensive and gain a secure foothold on Kyushu played a vital role. The Japanese had prepared for the invasion, and utilized the terrain to great advantage. A 25-mile wall, encircling Hakata Bay, fortified the Mongols' primary landing-zone against incursion, making an amphibious assault extremely difficult. Although the Japanese had constructed a minor navy, it did little more than harass and annoy the Mongol ships, which had fastened their ships together into massive floating fortresses against Japanese assault. It was this action, however, that proved to cripple the Mongol fleet during the typhoon.
Dr. Kenzo Hayashida, head of the excavation, says he believes there were not 4,000 ships wrecked at Takashima; perhaps only 400 or so went down. He bases that in part on a rule of thumb Thomas Conlan suggests--that the legend exaggerates forces by a factor of ten--and the fact that the seabed is not simply carpeted with artifacts. A mathematical model of artifact density supports Hiyashida's contention.
The new interpretation, based on archaeology, reconstructs the "Mongol" fleet as a complex Chinese- and Korean-built naval force of 1,170 war junks, each about 240 feet long. Each carried about 60 crew and soldiers and was capable of transporting horses. They towed a landing craft known as a battoru, which could carry up to 20 men. There were also smaller warships, including 300 Korean two-masted fighting ships and suppy vessels. The dimensions of the larger warships, twice that of contemporary European vessels, come directly from the wreck excavated at Takashima. ...
... (The Khan) failed in Japan because he did not have enough ships to bring sufficient troops to fight and win on land. A naval batle was out of the question. First, the Japanese did not have a navy to fight, his fleet split and fought separate battles on land without a coordinated effort, and the Japanese fought on a terrain difficult for the invaders to handle. In addition, seasonal typhoons brought havoc and disaster when the invaders arrived too late in the season and stayed too long in their prolonged fights ashore.
--Delgado, James P. "Shooting Down the Kamikaze Myth," in Naval History, June 2003, p. 41.