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Dr. Kenzo Hayashida, head of the excavation, says he believes there were not 4,000 ships wrecked at Takashima; perhaps only 400 or so went down. He bases that in part on a rule of thumb Thomas Conlan suggests--that the legend exaggerates forces by a factor of ten--and the fact that the seabed is not simply carpeted with artifacts. A mathematical model of artifact density supports Hiyashida's contention.
The new interpretation, based on archaeology, reconstructs the "Mongol" fleet as a complex Chinese- and Korean-built naval force of 1,170 war junks, each about 240 feet long. Each carried about 60 crew and soldiers and was capable of transporting horses. They towed a landing craft known as a battoru, which could carry up to 20 men. There were also smaller warships, including 300 Korean two-masted fighting ships and suppy vessels. The dimensions of the larger warships, twice that of contemporary European vessels, come directly from the wreck excavated at Takashima. ...
... (The Khan) failed in Japan because he did not have enough ships to bring sufficient troops to fight and win on land. A naval batle was out of the question. First, the Japanese did not have a navy to fight, his fleet split and fought separate battles on land without a coordinated effort, and the Japanese fought on a terrain difficult for the invaders to handle. In addition, seasonal typhoons brought havoc and disaster when the invaders arrived too late in the season and stayed too long in their prolonged fights ashore.
--Delgado, James P. "Shooting Down the Kamikaze Myth," in Naval History, June 2003, p. 41.
.there are many legend in whole Japan if kids did not stop to cry.
parents would say " Kokuri and mokuri would came "
In tsushima and iki island, All men were murdered by them
all women was punctured to the hands and it tied the woman with the rope . they sent them as comfort women
100,000 south song army came at last
and 40,000 korean remnants of a defeated army + Song army started general attack to Japan
however ,They failed though they landed from Nagasaki.
Again, it is a standby on the ship.
then , The typhoon came.
they tried to home. and Japan chased them to Tsushima
they were captured at last.After it disarmed, south Song ppl were released, and the ship was given . they repatriated to the own country.
However , all korean and mongolian were executed..........
btw
since Battle of Baekgang, Japan never trusted korea............
this story is so interesting.
1272窶扼
窶愿コ窶怒ツ侵窶板ェ窶堙ー窶凖アナ陳セ [10]
ツ坂?壺?氾ュ窶堙俄?ケAツ坂?麓11]
1273窶扼 ナスO窶「テ環渉エ窶堙娯?板絶?堙ーナ陳ウ窶堙娯?氾坂?堙??凖⇒?ウ
忠烈王 - Wikipedia
常立寺 - WikipediaSome people complain that the beheadings of prisoners was cruel and unnecessary. Those people don't study pre-modern war that often. Besides, it served as a mighty deterrent against possible future aggression
Engaku-ji - WikipediaThe temple was founded in 1282 by a Chinese Zen monk at the request of the then ruler of Japan, the regent Hōjō Tokimune after he had repelled a Mongolian invasion in the period 1274 to 1281. Tokimune had a long-standing commitment to Zen and the temple was intended to honour those of both sides who died in the war,
The 100,000-man force is probably an exaggeration. The logistics would have made such an invasion almost impossible to effectively stage. Xerxes supposedly invaded Greece with that many men during the Thermopylae-Salamis campaign (480s BC). This is common before Thucydides--most battle records are grossly exaggerated
I think it is not an exaggeration...
as the victim ....
Mongol troops finally conquered Southern Song Dynasty ( remaining southern part of China > south of Huai River after Chinese lost in the North ) in 1279.Second invasion of Japan came in 1281,Han-Chinese generals テ、窶披?「ツカナ津 & 窶披?コ窶凖ォ ( plus others ) led an army of 100,000 from Yangtze region.
If the sources did not exaggerate this, then I'm a monkey's uncle.caster51 said:I think it is not an exaggeration
The whole of the Roman Empire at it's height (Antonine Dynasty) had no more than 1/4 million men under arms (250,000) throughout the entire empire. This demanded at least 1 million acres of farmland devoted just to producing bread (let alone meat and vegetables to feed the army).
The logistics of actually equipping 100,000 men, constructing at least two or three thousand transport craft, and organizing cargo convoys to feed an army of that size, is nothing short of astounding.
I'm not saying the Yuan couldn't have done it administratively.I'm asking, would it have been economically feasible?
The army was so enormous it was actually recorded in historical texts that it took 30 days for all the armies to exit their last rallying point near Shanhaiguan before invading Korea; in one instance, the soldiers--both conscripted and paid-- listed over 3000 warships, 1.15 million infantry, 50,000 cavalry, 5000 artillery, and more.
Sui-Gogoryo chroniclers weren't inflating the troop size
GodEmperorLeto; I am looking forward to it.If I get more time, I'll see if I can't hit my University's library and gather more information. I take Wikipedia with a grain of salt. I've found mistakes on it before
Please do. I won't be able to check anything out myself until probably Monday afternoon US EST. But I'd appreciate anything you can recommend to me. This stuff is pretty interesting. I'm actually kind of excited by any new work being done, hence my enthusiasm over the koifun archaeology and the excavations of the Mongol shipwrecks.One good book on Sui Dynasty written by an American author
The Sui Dynasty: Wright, Arthur: 9780394492766: Amazon.com: Books
This coming weekend,I will dig up some reliable Chinese & American sources on military capabilities & statistics of Mongol's Japan invasion.
as far as i know, Song Dynasty was developed well though the fighting was weak.
2nd Japan Expedition,they smoothly defeated the outpost force in Tsushima and Iki this time too.They show up in the Kyushu northern part in the beginning of June.However, the coastline region in the Kyushu northern part turned into the fortified zone, and they could not land this time.
Promised south Song army did not come at all.Food was lacked because they were tossed in the sea for two months, and the epidemic spread in the shipboard because of the uncleanliness and starvation.3000 soldiers die without fighting......
It was not possible to return to home because of Khubilai's order
They waited for south Song army while enduring an obstinate pursuit of hungry and the Japanese attack.
100,000 south song army came at last,and 40,000 korean remnants of a defeated army + Song army started general attack to Japan.
Shuho and von Verschuer said:The Mongol invasions of Japanresulted from political developments on the continent. From his seat in Karakorumin Mongolia, Ghengis Khan (1167-1227) sent his hordes of horsemen throughNorth Asia. He soon besieged Beijing, capital of the Jurchen (Ch. Niizhen) Jin empire (1115-1234) based in Manchuria, occupied large partsof Xinjiang and InnerMongolia, and continued his military campaigns to the west throughthe Caucasus and Ukraine up to Poland. His four successors controlled the immense Mongol empire reaching from Hungary to Korea and from Moscow to the Persian Gulf. In China, the Jurchen, who had occupied the northern part of the country, drove the Song court out of the capital of Kaifeng it in 1127. In 1138 the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1279) established a new capital in Hangzhou Ji,i. In the 1230s the Jurchen Jin were themselves ousted by Ogodei Khan (1229-1241), and at the same time Kubilai Khan (1215-1294) started his campaigns against Korea, which was ruled by the Koryo dynasty (918-1392). After six Mongol invasions, in 1259 the Korean court submitted to Mongol suzerainty. As a forced ally of the Mongols, Korea subsequently played a central part in the Mongol invasions of Japan. In 1260 Kubilai Khan proclaimed himself Emperor Shizu (r. 1260-1294), in 1267 he moved his capital to Beijing, and in 1271 he established the Yuan dynasty.
Kubilai Khan finally occupied all of China in 1279, and the Mongol Yuan
dynasty (1206-1368) ruled the country until 1368. In Japan, Minamoto no Yoritomo (1147-1199), after his victory over the Taira in 1185, controlled large partsof easternJapan.He established his military government in Kamakuraand in 1192 obtained from Emperor Go-Toba (r. 1183-1198) appointment as shogun. The Kamakurabakufu extended its authority to other parts of the country, especially after Retired Emperor Go-Toba's failure in 1221 to reclaim prerogatives yielded to the bakufu, but political power in Kamakurasoon passed to the hands of the Hojo family who acted as regents to a succession of puppet shogun. The regent at the time of the Mongol invasions was Hojo Tokimune (1251-1284; regent, 1268-1284). The Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and in 1281 were preceded by a long prelude of threateningmessages from the Mongol courtin Beijing via Korea and were also followed for many years by continued threats of new Mongol offensives. The entire episode lasted in fact from 1265 to 1291. (On the events from 1266 to 1291, see Taigai kankeishi sogo nenpyo, pp. 196-238; Ishii Masatoshi' s notes and commentary in Zenrinkokuhoki,pp. 80-92,538-46; Murai2001; Kawazoe 1977. )
Japan learned for the firsttime about the Mongol threatin 1267. News reached
Kyoto from Kyushu that a Korean and a Mongolian envoy had arrived on
Tsushima island with letters addressed by their respective governments to the Japanese authorities. The diary of a court official notes for Bun'ei (1267).
11.25, "[Two] letters arrived [in Tsushima?] from Koryo. They say that the
Mongols have attacked and occupied Korea and that they will also attack Japan." (Geki nikki,cited in Taigai kankeishi sogo nenpyo, p. 196.) The letters themselves reached Kamakuraand Kyoto in early 1268, forwarded by the Kyushu governor (dazai no shoni) Muto Sukeyoshi Ai (1198-1281). The letter from Kubilai Khan is transcribed in the Zenrin kokuhoki entries for 1265 and 1266. It naturally caused the imperial court and shogunate much agitation. Messages went back and forth between Kyoto and Kamakura. Councils were held. Imperial messengers were sent to the Ise shrines.
Offerings were ordered throughout the country and prayers organized by the
head of the Tendai sect. After a five-month stay atthe Dazaifu ) (the Kyushu government), the Mongol and Korean envoys went back without any answer
from Japan.
After this prelude, Mongol and Korean envoys came to Japan nearly every
year. None were allowed to go to Kyoto or Kamakura,and some even were not allowed to land in Hakataafter first stopping in Tsushima. No envoy came back with an official reply from Japan, and in 1274 Kubilai Khan ordered an offensive. The Sino-Mongol-Korean army left from Korea and landed in Tsushima, Hirado FP, and Hakata bay. The battles lasted three weeks in the
tenth month of 1274 and ended with the retreat of the Mongol army (see the
Zenrin kokuhokientries of 1271 to 1274).
A year later (entry of 1275), an official delegation of the Yuan court for the
first time reached Kamakura. Hojo Tokimune, however, executed the envoys,
and Kubilai Khan ordered preparations for the next attack. In the meantime
Kubilai also continued his campaigns in China, which he occupied entirely in
1279. The next offensive against Japan, in 1281, was thus led by two fleets: a Chinese force from Jiangnan iI setting out from the coast near Ningbo gts
and an army of mixed origin that left from southern Korea. Battles were foughtin the sixth and seventh months on Takashima ! island situated off Matsuura the western coast of Kyushu, on Shika island in Hakatabay, and on
Iki island; they ended with the destruction of the Mongol fleet by a storm (see the entries of 1275 to 1281; As shown on the famous Moko sharai ekotoba (Scroll of the Mongol Invasions; ca. 1293), the Mongol armies used firearms.The exact natureof these explosives, called huopaojian in Chinese sources, remained unknown until a recent discovery on Takashima island.
At a point about ten meters deep offshore the island, archaeologists discovered around fifty fragments of a shipwreck and several dozens of earthenware balls fourteen centimeters in diameter that seem originally to have contained an explosive like sulphur. These balls might have had a string for a fuse and have been shot from a bow with an arrow. See Nihon keizai shinbun, 20 October 2001. For the Mongol firearms as reported in Chinese sources, see Yamauchi 2001, p. 23. ). Our authorquotes Genko shakusho (1322) and Kitabatake Chikafusa's (1293-1354) Jinno shotoki (1339) as saying that the gods have shown their power by appearing in the shape of a storm (entries of 1281 and 1299).
Yet the Mongol threats did not end in 1281. From 1283 the Mongol ruleragain
sent envoys to Japan with threatening messages and began preparations for a third offensive against Japan. As the earlier delegations of secular officials had all failed, Kubilai this time sent Buddhist priests because religious figures had previously been welcomed in Japan. Like earlier missives, Kubilai's letter
broughtby the priest Ruzhi (dates unknown) presses Japanto acknowledge
Mongol suzerainty. In 1286 Kubilai Khan finally gave up the idea of mounting
a furtheroffensive against Japan.Yet Ruzhi was sent once more to Japanin 1291; and in 1299 the grandson of Kubilai, Emperor Chengzong (r. 1294-1307) again tried to obtain Japanese submission by sending the Chinese priest Yishan Yining (Jp. Issan Ichinei, 1247-1317) as an envoy (see the entries from 1283 to 1299).
The account in Zenrin kokuhoki of the Mongol invasions can be valued as the
oldest extant synthesis of sources, written only two centuries afterthe event.(Kawazoe 1977, p. 64.). Its vivid description of the succession of developments allows the reader to grasp the situation both on the continent and in Japan.Not limiting himself to following any single Japanese account, Zuikei Shuho draws on both Chinese and Japanese sources, and thereby presents a view "fromwithout as well as within."
Among the Chinese sources he quotes are Yuanshi -C (History of the Yuan
Dynasty), written by Song Lian *5 (1310-1381) in 1370, which traces the
Mongol campaigns and rule in China from the time of Genghis Khan. Chapter
208 contains an account of relations with Japan.Zuikei Shuho also cites a work he terms Song Yuan tongjian cS7t (Complete Mirrorof the Song and Yuan Dynasties). Although several extant texts carry this title, none contain the passages quoted by Zuikei Shuho. Most (but not all) of the information taken from this work corresponds to material found also in Yuanshi and Koryosa fit (History of the Koryo Dynasty), completed in 1451 by Kim Chongso (1390-1453) et al. It seems possible that Zuikei Shuho made use of a Chinese work that has been lost today. The reportof the missions of Ruzhi is quoted from the diary Haiyinjiedai'anji, written by the priest himself, which is also lost today. Possibly Yishan Yining (Issan Ichinei), Ruzhi's successor as
abbot of the same temple in China, broughtthis diaryto Japanin 1299 andit was still extant in Zuikei Shuho's time. The text of the letter from Kubilai Khan brought to Japan by Ruzhi in 1283 cannot be found in Yuanshi or in Japanese sources other than Zenrin kokuhoki.
Among Japanese sources, Zuikei Shaho makes use of Genko shakusho, a col-
lection of Japanese and Chinese priests' biographies written by Kokan Shiren (1278-1346) in 1322, only fifty years after the Mongol wars, and Jinno shotoki which the Confucian scholar Kiyohara Naritada (1409-1467) valued as a historical treatise and brought to Zuikei Shauh's attention. Zuikei Shuho also cites a source (or sources) he termsNihon koki EBtd3 (Old Records of Japan).As for the events concerning the Mongols, the passages he quotes correspond to similar passages in Teio hennenki *E5TN*, a chronicle attributed to the priest Eiyiu and writtenbetween 1364 and 1380. In the entry for 1286, Zuikei Shuho states his personal opinion regarding the invasions. To him, the Mongol invasions could have been avoided if the Kamakura bakufu had responded promptlyto the Mongol messages andnot left them without any reply.
He also criticizes the Chinese sources for noting only that the Yuan court abandoned the offensive and not making clear the reason why. To Zuikei Shuho, the Mongols did not give up theirplans of theirown volition; they had been defeated thanks to the "power of the country of the gods."
Zenrin kokuhoki's account of the Mongol episodes is quite detailed, probablybecause these events left an importantmarkon Japan's history and also because they document the glory of the country. The opposite is true for the problems caused by piracy in the JapanSea during the thirteenthand fourteenth centuries.
Our text presents this somewhat embarrassingmatterfor Japanin only sporadic
form in the context of discussion of diplomatic correspondence with Korea and China. If the Mongol episodes can be styled a success story, the issue of piracy reflects the failure of the Japanese authorities to control the situation. Zuikei Shuho mentions piracy only from 1367 onwards, but the problem started in the 1220s.