I agree with the general premise of that article, which is "It is a mistake to think the Japanese were shocked into surrender by the dropping of the atomic bombs". It does a good job in deflating the myth that the two bombs ended the war. Unfortunately this myth is becoming a stubborn fixture in the American mind.
But I think he author, Ward Wilson, overplays his hand when he starts to speculate that the bombs were inconsequential, that the Japanese leadership barely noticed them. This is mythmaking of another kind - the myth of US irrelevance.
He expends some text arguing that it took 3 days after the Hiroshima bombing to convene a strategy meeting, therefore this time lag indicates a lack of urgency with regard to Hiroshima. (It only took Kennedy a few hours to respond to the Cuban missile placement, etc.). It is a dishonest manipulation of the facts. The Cuban Missile Crisis, and the North Korean invasion into the South both took days to unfold as well. In Japan, as soon as the morning of the 7th in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo was already discussing the bombing of Hiroshima, and said the bomb was reason to consider accepting the Potsdam Declaration, but the Army pressed for more time to analyze results of investigations. So there was immediate action, it just not the kind of action that Wilson anticipates. The problem wasn't that the Japanese didn't care about the bombs. The problem was the Army wanted to press on to the bitter end, and the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister were unable to stand up to the army.
The War Council met on the morning of the 9th, and Army Minister Anami said "I am confident that we are ready for battles. I am sure we are well prepared for a decisive battle on our mainland even against the United States." Army General Staff Umezu said, "I absolutely agree with the opinion of the Army Minister. We are prepared for a decisive battle on our mainland. Although the Soviet entry into the war is disadvantageous to us, we are still not in a situation where we should be forced to agree to an unconditional surrender".
So Wilson's argument that the Soviet entry into the war eliminated all of Japan's options and motivated them to surrender, is invalidated. Or, if Japan's leadership saw the Soviet invasion as a total game-changer, they didn't mention it as such during the most important meeting of the war. Instead, the Army's conviction in its ability to continue fighting was unaltered, and they continued to believe their decisive battle would be a land battle with the US, even after the Soviets entered the war.
So the entry of the Soviets didn't even completely persuade the War Council to consider surrendering with some conditions. It just caused the entrenched positions to become more entrenched. It was an impasse that lasted until the night of the 9th (and the early morning of the 10th) when the Emperor made the call to "kind of" accept the Potsdam Declaration at the "Gozen Kaigi".
Which brings up another question; if Japan is determined to fight on despite destruction of all of its cities, what should the US response be? It brings up an awful calculation of human life when one nation decides its own citizens aren't worth saving, and turns Wilson's secondary argument on its head. If the firebombs and atomic bombs were to have no effect on Japan, then surely a land invasion was similarly going to have no effect either (and Anami said as much). "We should live up to our cause even if our hundred million people have to die side by side in battle". Nowhere does the Japanese leadership indicate that a land war with the Soviets is too awful to contemplate. The military establishment in Japan is ready for a suicide mission, and it puts the onus of saving Japan from itself onto the US, which is the way these historical revisions tend to drift.
Americans would do well to understand that the end of WW2 was more complicated than is generally believed, but to negate the impact of the American effort is miseducation as well.