Pakistan nuclear export centrifuges to North Korea?

[indian_sukhoi]

Did Pakistan nuclear expert export centrifuges to North Korea?
President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan said Monday that he believes that A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear expert who ran the world's largest proliferation ring, exported "probably a dozen" centrifuges to North Korea to produce nuclear weapons fuel. The Pakistani leader also said that after two years of interrogations of Khan there was still no evidence about whether he also gave North Korea a Chinese-origin design to build a nuclear weapon.
Musharraf's comments in an interview, which echo statements he made last month to Japanese reporters, came a day before the United States reopens talks with North Korea about its nuclear program in Beijing. The Pakistani leader's comments about the results of the interrogations of Khan, a national hero who is under a loose form of house arrest in Islamabad, are significant because they tend to confirm the accusations U.S. intelligence officials made against North Korea in 2002.
At that time, North Korean officials appeared to confirm that they had secretly started up a second nuclear program to build atomic weapons using uranium technology obtained from Khan's network, as an alternative to a plutonium program that was frozen under a 1994 agreement with the United States. But ever since, North Korea has denied that a second, secret bomb program exists.
A dozen centrifuges would not be enough to produce a significant amount of bomb-grade uranium. But U.S. officials say they would have enabled North Korea to copy the design and build their own.

The Bush administration has insisted that unless North Korea agrees to give up both programs -- and agrees to a broad program of inspections -- no comprehensive nuclear deal can be reached. North Korea has suggested it may be willing to give up its older plutonium program, based at a huge nuclear complex located at Yongbyon, but has reiterated its denials that it has hidden centrifuges to make bomb-grade uranium.
In a wide-ranging discussion in New York with three journalists from the New York Times, Musharraf also discussed Pakistan's tentative diplomatic openings toward Israel and its efforts to track down al-Qaida leaders. He said that the opening to Israel could flourish "in case there is forward movement" on negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, but he said, "this is by no means recognition of Israel." Despite protests in Pakistan about the new initiative, he insisted that his move has met little opposition among mainstream Muslims in Pakistan, and he is to address a Jewish group for the first time during his visit here.
"What is the harm if I interacted with the Jewish Congress, knowing their influence here?" he said.
He said it was possible that Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaida leader, is still moving between remote parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan four years after the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States. "I will not negate entirely, with confidence, that he is not there," he said. "But I will never accept anybody who says with confidence that he is there." He said later that he often asks: "Do you have intelligence, have you heard him?"
Bin Laden's whereabouts are a particularly sensitive subject for Musharraf because Pakistan has been accused by some intelligence officials of doing a lackluster job of pursuing al-Qaida suspects, stepping up pressure on them when it suits Pakistani interests but turning down the pressure at other times. He rejected that charge and said bin Laden's power is reduced, no matter where he is.
"I do not think he can influence, because he is on the run, hiding," Musharraf said. If bin Laden is on the Pakistan-Afghan border, he is switching sides "wherever he sees danger," Musharraf added.
He rejected arguments that Pakistan was half-hearted in its efforts to root out al-Qaida and remnants of the Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan until the American-led war there in 2001. "We have almost eliminated them from our cities -- we have caught about 700 of them -- and we have broken their back in the mountains," he said. The groups no longer operate in the valleys of the Afghan border area, he said, "because we have occupied them."
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, also speaking to reporters on Monday at The New York Times, praised Musharraf for working in three areas and said the United States would be supportive: helping to pursue members of al-Qaida; creating "diplomatic space" for operating by reaching out to India and Israel, and working to improve education and the economy to discourage militancy. "There are parts of Pakistan that are extremely poor where you get breeding grounds for this kind of extremism," she said, and the United States would help him deal with those.
Musharraf said that, in a meeting he had Monday with Rice, he asked her to begin action toward a free-trade agreement with Pakistan. That is likely to meet some resistance in Congress, which derailed efforts by the Bush administration after the Sept. 11 attacks to aid Pakistan by lifting restrictions on textile imports.

 

[indian_sukhoi]

NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: NERVOUSNESS IN PAKISTAN
By B. Raman
According to well-informed sources in Pakistan of well-established credibility, there is nervousness in Pakistan that fresh enquiries by the US into North Korea's nuclear capability might bring out hitherto unknown (to the international community) information relating to co-operation between Pakistan and North Korea in the nuclear and missile fields. These sources say that Maj. Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, who is a close personal friend of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has informed Gen. Musharraf that after the North Korean nuclear test of October 9, 2006, the US intelligence has been asked to do an update of a National Intelligence Estimate of 2002 on Pakistan-North Korea nuclear co-operation and to talk to Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, former Pakistani Prime Ministers, about it. Details of the reported National Intelligence Estimate were given by Mr. Seymour Hersh, the well-known investigative journalist, in an article published by the New Yorker magazine on January 27, 2003. A copy of the article is annexed.
2. While Pakistan's military relationship with North Korea in the field of purchase and joint development of conventional weapons dates back to the period before the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the co-operation in the missile and nuclear fields dates back to the visit of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister, to Pyongyang in 1993. The visit and the resulting discussions on bilateral co-operation in the field of missile purchase and development were facilitated by China.
3. The Chinese entities, which were supplying the M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, had come under intense scrutiny by the US during the tenure (1988-92) of Mr. George Bush, the father of the present President, and the subsequent tenure of President Bill Clinton. This pressure partly contributed to the Chinese decision to put Pakistan in touch with North Korea and facilitate the acquisition of North Korean missiles and related technology by Islamabad. Mrs. Bhutto's talks in Pyongyang were successful and led to the signing of a formal agreement on this subject in 1995.
4. Pakistan's missile and nuclear relationship with North Korea since then has proceeded as follows:
· 1993-97: The co-operation was confined to missiles and missile-related technology.
· 1997-2003: The co-operation was expanded to cover the nuclear field. What was initially a missile for cash and wheat deal became a missiles and missile know-how for nuclear material and nuclear know-how barter deal. This decision to convert it into a barter deal was attributable partly to the cash crunch faced by Pakistan, the difficulties faced by Pakistan in procuring wheat from abroad for supplying to North Korea and North Korea's decision to go nuclear and the reported Chinese reluctance to help it directly since the Chinese nuclear entities were under close watch by the US intelligence. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear co-operation took the form of transfer of know-how, visits of North Korean nuclear scientists to Pakistani nuclear establishments, the presence of North Korean nuclear scientists during the nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan at Chagai in May, 1998, and the supply of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to North Korea.
5. Till 2000, the transport of missiles and nuclear material in the two directions was mainly by sea and air. During the Clinton Administration, Mr. Richard Armitage, who was at that time doing security consultancy work, was commissioned by a Congressional Committee to prepare a paper on how to prevent the clandestine transport of nuclear-related material by sea. He presented a paper on this subject to the Committee and also gave an oral testimony. He suggested interdiction of suspected ships and proposed other ideas, which became the subsequent basis of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) under the Bush Administration. Mr. Armitage, who functioned as the Deputy Secretary of State during the first tenure of Mr. Bush, continued to take interest in the subject of interdictions as one of the options to prevent proliferation.
6. This led to a re-examination by Pakistan and North Korea----with the reported knowledge of China--- of the mode of a transport used till then and to the decision to transport the material thereafter by train via China and by road from the Xinjiang Province of China via the Karakoram Highway, initially built with Chinese assistance in the 1960s and the 1970s and now being upgraded, also with Chinese assistance.
7. The policy of General Pervez Musharraf has been to accept only those aspects of the co-operation about which the US has obtained credible evidence and deny the rest and to put all the blame on Dr. A. Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist. Till 2003, Musharraf denied the supply of centrifuges and admitted it only after it had been established by the US. He has not so far admitted any Pakistani role in assisting North Korea in the field of plutonium re-processing and the use of the overland route for the proliferation activities.
8. The nervousness in Islamabad after the North Korean nuclear test is due to, firstly, fears that fresh enquiries by the US might bring out hitherto unadmitted (by Pakistan) aspects of its co-operation with North Korea; secondly, fears that the pressure on it to hand over A. Q. Khan for interrogation by US investigators might increase; and, thirdly, that Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, who were considerably in the picture about this c-operation, might reveal the details to the US because of their anger over Musharraf's refusal to let them return to Pakistan and contest next year's elections to the National Assembly. If rightly approached by the US, Mrs. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif might be inclined to speak about the role of the Army---particularly Musharraf--in this co-operation, but not about their own role. According to these sources, Musharraf is particularly nervous that Mrs. Bhutto, who is more knowledgeable than Mr. Sharif, might start talking about this co-operation with the Americans. It is to pre-empt her doing so that he has reportedly been trying to make some political overtures to her.
9. The present visit to the US of Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic and Plan Division, who oversees the nuclear and missile programme on behalf of Musharraf---whether the visit it is at his instance or in response to a summons from the US-- is being utilised by him to remove any misperceptions in the US about Pakistan's role, explain its reluctance to hand over Khan and to project Pakistan as willing to co-operate with the US in any further investigation. He has been meeting Congressional aides---since most Congressmen are busy with the Congressional elections-- research scholars of think-tanks and proliferation experts. He also held an unattributable (to him) briefing for the media in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington.
10. During his interactions, Lt. Gen. Kidwai has reportedly been making the following points:
· A. Q. Khan gave the centrifuges to North Korea for the low grade enrichment of uranium for the production of electricity and not high grade enrichment for military purposes.
· A. Q. Khan has had no role in helping North Korea in respect of the plutonium reprocessing technology or weapon design.
· However, if the US wants fresh enquiries to be made, Pakistan will be willing to co-operate without handing over Khan.
11. He has also been utilising the opportunity of his interactions to stress upon the US policy-makers the need to have a second look at the US-India civilian nuclear co-operation deal in the light of the North Korean nuclear test. His argument has been: either put the deal with India in the cold storage or if the US has to go ahead with it, treat Pakistan on par with India. He has also been making the point that China has offered to supply six more nuclear power stations to Pakistan and that it will not be in the US interest for Pakistan to become dependent on China because of the US' discriminatory attitude.

NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: NERVOUSNESS IN PAKISTAN
By B. Raman
According to well-informed sources in Pakistan of well-established credibility, there is nervousness in Pakistan that fresh enquiries by the US into North Korea's nuclear capability might bring out hitherto unknown (to the international community) information relating to co-operation between Pakistan and North Korea in the nuclear and missile fields. These sources say that Maj. Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, who is a close personal friend of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has informed Gen. Musharraf that after the North Korean nuclear test of October 9, 2006, the US intelligence has been asked to do an update of a National Intelligence Estimate of 2002 on Pakistan-North Korea nuclear co-operation and to talk to Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, former Pakistani Prime Ministers, about it. Details of the reported National Intelligence Estimate were given by Mr. Seymour Hersh, the well-known investigative journalist, in an article published by the New Yorker magazine on January 27, 2003. A copy of the article is annexed.
2. While Pakistan's military relationship with North Korea in the field of purchase and joint development of conventional weapons dates back to the period before the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the co-operation in the missile and nuclear fields dates back to the visit of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister, to Pyongyang in 1993. The visit and the resulting discussions on bilateral co-operation in the field of missile purchase and development were facilitated by China.
3. The Chinese entities, which were supplying the M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, had come under intense scrutiny by the US during the tenure (1988-92) of Mr. George Bush, the father of the present President, and the subsequent tenure of President Bill Clinton. This pressure partly contributed to the Chinese decision to put Pakistan in touch with North Korea and facilitate the acquisition of North Korean missiles and related technology by Islamabad. Mrs. Bhutto's talks in Pyongyang were successful and led to the signing of a formal agreement on this subject in 1995.
4. Pakistan's missile and nuclear relationship with North Korea since then has proceeded as follows:
· 1993-97: The co-operation was confined to missiles and missile-related technology.
· 1997-2003: The co-operation was expanded to cover the nuclear field. What was initially a missile for cash and wheat deal became a missiles and missile know-how for nuclear material and nuclear know-how barter deal. This decision to convert it into a barter deal was attributable partly to the cash crunch faced by Pakistan, the difficulties faced by Pakistan in procuring wheat from abroad for supplying to North Korea and North Korea's decision to go nuclear and the reported Chinese reluctance to help it directly since the Chinese nuclear entities were under close watch by the US intelligence. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear co-operation took the form of transfer of know-how, visits of North Korean nuclear scientists to Pakistani nuclear establishments, the presence of North Korean nuclear scientists during the nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan at Chagai in May, 1998, and the supply of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to North Korea.
5. Till 2000, the transport of missiles and nuclear material in the two directions was mainly by sea and air. During the Clinton Administration, Mr. Richard Armitage, who was at that time doing security consultancy work, was commissioned by a Congressional Committee to prepare a paper on how to prevent the clandestine transport of nuclear-related material by sea. He presented a paper on this subject to the Committee and also gave an oral testimony. He suggested interdiction of suspected ships and proposed other ideas, which became the subsequent basis of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) under the Bush Administration. Mr. Armitage, who functioned as the Deputy Secretary of State during the first tenure of Mr. Bush, continued to take interest in the subject of interdictions as one of the options to prevent proliferation.
6. This led to a re-examination by Pakistan and North Korea----with the reported knowledge of China--- of the mode of a transport used till then and to the decision to transport the material thereafter by train via China and by road from the Xinjiang Province of China via the Karakoram Highway, initially built with Chinese assistance in the 1960s and the 1970s and now being upgraded, also with Chinese assistance.
7. The policy of General Pervez Musharraf has been to accept only those aspects of the co-operation about which the US has obtained credible evidence and deny the rest and to put all the blame on Dr. A. Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist. Till 2003, Musharraf denied the supply of centrifuges and admitted it only after it had been established by the US. He has not so far admitted any Pakistani role in assisting North Korea in the field of plutonium re-processing and the use of the overland route for the proliferation activities.
8. The nervousness in Islamabad after the North Korean nuclear test is due to, firstly, fears that fresh enquiries by the US might bring out hitherto unadmitted (by Pakistan) aspects of its co-operation with North Korea; secondly, fears that the pressure on it to hand over A. Q. Khan for interrogation by US investigators might increase; and, thirdly, that Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, who were considerably in the picture about this c-operation, might reveal the details to the US because of their anger over Musharraf's refusal to let them return to Pakistan and contest next year's elections to the National Assembly. If rightly approached by the US, Mrs. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif might be inclined to speak about the role of the Army---particularly Musharraf--in this co-operation, but not about their own role. According to these sources, Musharraf is particularly nervous that Mrs. Bhutto, who is more knowledgeable than Mr. Sharif, might start talking about this co-operation with the Americans. It is to pre-empt her doing so that he has reportedly been trying to make some political overtures to her.
9. The present visit to the US of Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic and Plan Division, who oversees the nuclear and missile programme on behalf of Musharraf---whether the visit it is at his instance or in response to a summons from the US-- is being utilised by him to remove any misperceptions in the US about Pakistan's role, explain its reluctance to hand over Khan and to project Pakistan as willing to co-operate with the US in any further investigation. He has been meeting Congressional aides---since most Congressmen are busy with the Congressional elections-- research scholars of think-tanks and proliferation experts. He also held an unattributable (to him) briefing for the media in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington.
10. During his interactions, Lt. Gen. Kidwai has reportedly been making the following points:
· A. Q. Khan gave the centrifuges to North Korea for the low grade enrichment of uranium for the production of electricity and not high grade enrichment for military purposes.
· A. Q. Khan has had no role in helping North Korea in respect of the plutonium reprocessing technology or weapon design.
· However, if the US wants fresh enquiries to be made, Pakistan will be willing to co-operate without handing over Khan.
11. He has also been utilising the opportunity of his interactions to stress upon the US policy-makers the need to have a second look at the US-India civilian nuclear co-operation deal in the light of the North Korean nuclear test. His argument has been: either put the deal with India in the cold storage or if the US has to go ahead with it, treat Pakistan on par with India. He has also been making the point that China has offered to supply six more nuclear power stations to Pakistan and that it will not be in the US interest for Pakistan to become dependent on China because of the US' discriminatory attitude.