Hiroshima and Nagasaki
- Thread starter thomas
- Start date
sabro
後輩
- 23 Apr 2004
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Taratara- excellent articles.
On one point you are mistaken. The bombs could not have been used in Europe because they were not ready. The bombing of Dresden happened on February 13, 1945. Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945. The first atomic bomb test didn't happen until July 16, 1945- over two months later. I think it is ridiculous to charge that we would not have used it on Germany if it had been ready a year earlier. Until Allied troops crossed the German Frontier, victory was not a certainty and the bombs almost certainly would have been used.
On the other point, we disagree. Japan did not surrender after the firebombing of Tokyo March 9-10, 1945. Nor did ten more days of intense bombing of nine other cities that resulted in over 500,000 deaths result in a surrender. Neither did the sinking of the Emperial Navy including the Yamato, nor the fall of Okinawa in June and July of 1945. Japan did not surrender after the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945. Japan continued to resist ferociously- taking an enormous toll on both sides. There was no indication of any desire to surrender until after both bombs had fallen.
The military had specific invasion plans, and was in the initial stages of moving the men and material necessary for it. The United States economy was busy producing more incidiary bombs, and heavy bombs, as well as shells for the heavy naval guns for a protracted "softening up" campaign of Hokkaido and souther Kyushu . War spending for 1946 was set to increase- in spite of the fact that Germany had already surrendered. Japan still had millions of soldiers and many more millions of civillians who were willing and able to keep fighting for years. They may have been on the ropes, but they were still capable of inflicting damage and fighting on and on.
Admiral Leahy was the only one that expressed reservations before hand, although Truman indicated that he recommended using the bomb. No other major leader of the few that were informed in the Pentagon or on the Dept. of War raised any concerns. Sec. Stimson, Gen. Leslie Groves, Adm. Nimitz, Gen. McArthur, Adm. Halsey, and Gen. LeMay all urged the dropping of the bomb. (Eisenhower was not informed until after the decision had been made.) Many of the scientist on the Manhatten project were concerned including Oppenheimer and sent a letter to Truman to that effect, but Truman never indicated whether he even read it. I don't know what the source is but if Nimitz expressed a reservation about dropping the bomb, it must have been much, much later.
Nearly every soldier and sailor who served in the Pacific, and certainly every POW that was held by the Japanese will credit the bomb with saving their lives. We need to keep the decision to drop the bomb in context.
I don't think carpet bombing, firebombing, or the atomic bombing of civillians should ever be allowable. Certainly during World War II, it would have been incomprehensible for Americans to consider these acts as atrocities or war crimes- but they certainly were attrocious. The military leadership and the public at large believed that not only were these actions neccessary, they were justified. And it is difficult for me, sixty years later, in my safe cushiony seat to judge that attitude. These people did not initiate the conflict, but they did end it in the quickest most efficient way the knew of.
On one point you are mistaken. The bombs could not have been used in Europe because they were not ready. The bombing of Dresden happened on February 13, 1945. Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945. The first atomic bomb test didn't happen until July 16, 1945- over two months later. I think it is ridiculous to charge that we would not have used it on Germany if it had been ready a year earlier. Until Allied troops crossed the German Frontier, victory was not a certainty and the bombs almost certainly would have been used.
On the other point, we disagree. Japan did not surrender after the firebombing of Tokyo March 9-10, 1945. Nor did ten more days of intense bombing of nine other cities that resulted in over 500,000 deaths result in a surrender. Neither did the sinking of the Emperial Navy including the Yamato, nor the fall of Okinawa in June and July of 1945. Japan did not surrender after the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945. Japan continued to resist ferociously- taking an enormous toll on both sides. There was no indication of any desire to surrender until after both bombs had fallen.
The military had specific invasion plans, and was in the initial stages of moving the men and material necessary for it. The United States economy was busy producing more incidiary bombs, and heavy bombs, as well as shells for the heavy naval guns for a protracted "softening up" campaign of Hokkaido and souther Kyushu . War spending for 1946 was set to increase- in spite of the fact that Germany had already surrendered. Japan still had millions of soldiers and many more millions of civillians who were willing and able to keep fighting for years. They may have been on the ropes, but they were still capable of inflicting damage and fighting on and on.
Admiral Leahy was the only one that expressed reservations before hand, although Truman indicated that he recommended using the bomb. No other major leader of the few that were informed in the Pentagon or on the Dept. of War raised any concerns. Sec. Stimson, Gen. Leslie Groves, Adm. Nimitz, Gen. McArthur, Adm. Halsey, and Gen. LeMay all urged the dropping of the bomb. (Eisenhower was not informed until after the decision had been made.) Many of the scientist on the Manhatten project were concerned including Oppenheimer and sent a letter to Truman to that effect, but Truman never indicated whether he even read it. I don't know what the source is but if Nimitz expressed a reservation about dropping the bomb, it must have been much, much later.
Nearly every soldier and sailor who served in the Pacific, and certainly every POW that was held by the Japanese will credit the bomb with saving their lives. We need to keep the decision to drop the bomb in context.
I don't think carpet bombing, firebombing, or the atomic bombing of civillians should ever be allowable. Certainly during World War II, it would have been incomprehensible for Americans to consider these acts as atrocities or war crimes- but they certainly were attrocious. The military leadership and the public at large believed that not only were these actions neccessary, they were justified. And it is difficult for me, sixty years later, in my safe cushiony seat to judge that attitude. These people did not initiate the conflict, but they did end it in the quickest most efficient way the knew of.
I'm surprised that you are both unaware of this, why do you think the second A-bomb was dropped? The two A-bombs were different types. You're both talking about the plutonium type (uranium partly used). The test that took place on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico was a "plutonium type A-bomb" same as the one dropped over Nagasaki, "Fat Man." The first A-bomb that was dropped over Hiroshima "Thin Man or Little Boy" was uranium type that does not require and was not tested beforehand and was completed by the time of the bombings of Dresden. Why do plutonium type A-bombs require test explosion?, because the firing mechanism is much complicated and you can find enough info over the net. It is fair to say that an island, such as Japan was ideal for the first A-bombs to be dropped. The immediate after effects were studied thoroughly by the US through the ABCC (Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission) set up in Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
bossel
後輩
- 28 Sep 2003
- 1,485
- 45
Are we? Where did I say so?tarattara said:
AFAIK, Little Boy was only completed after Trinity was tested. If I'm correctly informed only in July 45 they had enough U-235 & only at the end of July construction was completed, more than 2 months after German capitulation.
sabro
後輩
- 23 Apr 2004
- 1,006
- 35
I personally think the second A bomb was dropped for a few reasons, none of which minimizes the carnage and suffering of the people of Nagasaki. Certainly the fact that Japan did not respond in the days after Hiroshima would be one reason. A warning to the USSR, could be another. Completing the bluff that "we got a bunch of these, and we could keep doing this over and over," is compelling. As is the general with the new weapon who is just dying to try it- idea. Again, I agree with Bossel, that neither bomb was ready before the German surrender.
Also, it does seem unfair that the winners got to decide what a war crime was, and who would be charged, but I don't know how it could have worked any differently. You don't win the largest armed conflict in human history and then turn around and punish your own leaders.
I still am terribly uncomfortable with the rationale for dropping bombs on civillian targets.
Also, it does seem unfair that the winners got to decide what a war crime was, and who would be charged, but I don't know how it could have worked any differently. You don't win the largest armed conflict in human history and then turn around and punish your own leaders.
I still am terribly uncomfortable with the rationale for dropping bombs on civillian targets.
Tsuwabuki
先輩
- 12 May 2005
- 51
- 5
I have to speak as a member of the military here, something I typically do not do. I honestly feel that the the problem with conversations like this usually tend to leave out the fact that war, by its very nature, is atrocious. It's horrible. It's ugly, mean, violent, revolting... It is hell. We cannot really judge the actions of a group of people that genuinely felt that they had no choice but to kill millions in order to save an unspecified amount, projected numbers of casualities seeming to run much higher than the populations of the two cities combined.
We'll never know if dropping the bombs was the right or wrong decision. I don't think we ever can know.
We'll never know if dropping the bombs was the right or wrong decision. I don't think we ever can know.
sabro
後輩
- 23 Apr 2004
- 1,006
- 35
Kevin-
I appreciate your comment and agree with it. I would like to believe somehow that we are beyond the need to ever wage war on such a massive scale. As for dropping the bombs being the right or wrong decision, in the context of WWII, those people had to feel entirely justified. The bombs had the exact desired effect and the war was ended. Like I have said earlier, it is way to easy to take it out of that context and be an armchair QB.
I appreciate your comment and agree with it. I would like to believe somehow that we are beyond the need to ever wage war on such a massive scale. As for dropping the bombs being the right or wrong decision, in the context of WWII, those people had to feel entirely justified. The bombs had the exact desired effect and the war was ended. Like I have said earlier, it is way to easy to take it out of that context and be an armchair QB.
I'm reading "Hiroshima in America" right now. It seems to argue very convincingly that the idea that dropping the bomb was all, or even mainly, about shortening the war, is simply not true.
The firebombings not producing a peace offer is questionable: many people within the japanese regime to active steps to try to get the war over with, long before the A-bombs.
Besides, that argument can easily be reversed: if not even the Tokyo firebombings could produce a surrender, why would the A-bombs? In fact, the Hiroshima bomb didn't do it - at least not before Nagasaki - and the Russian entry into the war may very well have been enough. In either case, there's no way the U.S.G. could be sure that these specific atrocities would shorten the war.
There where lots of alternatives: make a clear agreement on the role of the emperor, wait for Russia to declare war, or show of the bomb at some desolate place. My impression is that the USG wanted to use the bomb whether it would shorten the war or not. They reaped some clear benefits of this: internationally in negotiations with Russia, and domestically in defending the A-bomb expenditures.
The firebombings not producing a peace offer is questionable: many people within the japanese regime to active steps to try to get the war over with, long before the A-bombs.
Besides, that argument can easily be reversed: if not even the Tokyo firebombings could produce a surrender, why would the A-bombs? In fact, the Hiroshima bomb didn't do it - at least not before Nagasaki - and the Russian entry into the war may very well have been enough. In either case, there's no way the U.S.G. could be sure that these specific atrocities would shorten the war.
There where lots of alternatives: make a clear agreement on the role of the emperor, wait for Russia to declare war, or show of the bomb at some desolate place. My impression is that the USG wanted to use the bomb whether it would shorten the war or not. They reaped some clear benefits of this: internationally in negotiations with Russia, and domestically in defending the A-bomb expenditures.
It's easy to second-guess. The fact is, there was a war going on, a very bitter war, and the United States government was determined to do as much as it could, whatever it could, to end the war quickly, and avoid an invasion that would have cost millions of American (and, incidentally, Japanese) lives.
You can nitpick all you want about whether it would have ended anyway, and how soon. Did they know for sure that dropping the bombs would end the war? Of course not. Were they going to sit around and wait until they were positive that dropping the bombs would end the war? Of course not. It was possible that dropping the bombs would hasten the end of the war more quickly, so they dropped the bombs. They dropped the bombs, and the war ended -- practically immediately. That's why they did it, and that's what happened.
You can nitpick all you want about whether it would have ended anyway, and how soon. Did they know for sure that dropping the bombs would end the war? Of course not. Were they going to sit around and wait until they were positive that dropping the bombs would end the war? Of course not. It was possible that dropping the bombs would hasten the end of the war more quickly, so they dropped the bombs. They dropped the bombs, and the war ended -- practically immediately. That's why they did it, and that's what happened.
Sukotto
先輩
- 9 Jul 2003
- 1,426
- 20
Wasn't the decision even to build the bomb in the first place
something that went beyond the authority of
and kept in secret from the US congress?
If so a dangerous precedent that will have set.
We can take a look at post-WW2 history and
see if they've ever done it again.
This should be a prologue to any debate on the topic by those
(Americans for sure since it was our government)
that care about democratic constitutional government -
which is what they were fighting for.
something that went beyond the authority of
and kept in secret from the US congress?
If so a dangerous precedent that will have set.
We can take a look at post-WW2 history and
see if they've ever done it again.
This should be a prologue to any debate on the topic by those
(Americans for sure since it was our government)
that care about democratic constitutional government -
which is what they were fighting for.
Sukotto said:
No, absolutely not. Once Congress has declared war, it's the President's job to wage it as effectively as he can, however he decides to do it. As Commander in Chief, he does not have to ask permission for any military action against the enemy at all; he goes on waging war as he decides to, until Congress tells him to stop fighting.
sabro
後輩
- 23 Apr 2004
- 1,006
- 35
Most of the military was actively preparing for the invasion of Japan. Even at the highest levels, very few knew anything at all about the bomb. Some like Eisenhower who was not in the loop, felt the bomb was unnecessary. The others involved were near unanimous in support of Trumans ultimate decision. As for the surrender, the proverbial ball was in the Japanese court. I am certain also that although the bomb may have saved Japanese lives by shortening the war, there was a disregard for the lives of all the Japanese civillians- whether we were firebombing Tokyo or nuking Hiroshima and Japan- the US government and people probable felt fine about extremely high casualty rates.
Bramicus: It's very easy - if they had been interested in trying to avoid atrocities, they could have waited for the Russians to declare war instead of doing their best two drop both a-bombs before that happened. I'll cite some quotes discussed in the book I mentioned earlier.
Harry Truman wrote in his Potsdam diary: "I've gotten what I came for - Stalin goes to war on August 15 with no strings on it ... I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed!". He even wrote "fini japs when that comes about." But as Byrnes recalled later: "neither the President nor I was anxious to have them enter the war after we heard of the successful test", and "it was important to bring about an end to the war - and if possible to do that before Russia came into the war." (p 149 f)
They could also have given the japanese regime a clear message that the emperor would be preserved. They were very aware of this possibility. For example, Joseph Grew told Truman on May 28 that "the greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne". Grew later reported that the president had expressed interest "because his own thoughts had been following the same line". (p 134)
They could even have showed off the bomb in public, as many suggested. Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, for example, argued that it was "quite possible" that this could be "the opportunity the Japanese are looking for" to surrender. (p 141f)
All of these options were actively rejected. There were no military risks in trying them before using the a-bombs.
To be sure, there where people who thought an invasion would be necessary. General Marshall for example thought it'd be necessary whether the a-bombs were dropped or not (though some say he thought a Soviet declaration of war would make the invasion unnecessary). (p 140) But a naval blockade was also an obvious alternative to invasion: Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, for example, didn't consider an invasion necessary. Neither did General Arnold or General LeMay, who thought conventional bombing would be enough. (p 141) Truman's later claim that his military advisors recommended using the a-bomb is misleading: most were neither strong proponents nor opposers of the a-bomb. (p 141)
Harry Truman wrote in his Potsdam diary: "I've gotten what I came for - Stalin goes to war on August 15 with no strings on it ... I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed!". He even wrote "fini japs when that comes about." But as Byrnes recalled later: "neither the President nor I was anxious to have them enter the war after we heard of the successful test", and "it was important to bring about an end to the war - and if possible to do that before Russia came into the war." (p 149 f)
They could also have given the japanese regime a clear message that the emperor would be preserved. They were very aware of this possibility. For example, Joseph Grew told Truman on May 28 that "the greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne". Grew later reported that the president had expressed interest "because his own thoughts had been following the same line". (p 134)
They could even have showed off the bomb in public, as many suggested. Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, for example, argued that it was "quite possible" that this could be "the opportunity the Japanese are looking for" to surrender. (p 141f)
All of these options were actively rejected. There were no military risks in trying them before using the a-bombs.
To be sure, there where people who thought an invasion would be necessary. General Marshall for example thought it'd be necessary whether the a-bombs were dropped or not (though some say he thought a Soviet declaration of war would make the invasion unnecessary). (p 140) But a naval blockade was also an obvious alternative to invasion: Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, for example, didn't consider an invasion necessary. Neither did General Arnold or General LeMay, who thought conventional bombing would be enough. (p 141) Truman's later claim that his military advisors recommended using the a-bomb is misleading: most were neither strong proponents nor opposers of the a-bomb. (p 141)
Bramicus: I take your silence on this matter as a confirmation that you found my "accusations" to be ast least more correct than you'd thought?
Sabro: I understand your point of view, but don't you think the issues I brought up implies that the USG policy did not, in fact, save lives in comparison to other, very possible policies?
Sabro: I understand your point of view, but don't you think the issues I brought up implies that the USG policy did not, in fact, save lives in comparison to other, very possible policies?
lexico
後輩
- 22 Dec 2004
- 2,584
- 155
Could you be more specific about the test; what when where how who?Sr Pasta said:
I think this is really the heart of this discussion. Why didn't the US detonate an A-bomb over Tokyo Bay (or any visible and not too distant location, but non-residential) as someone already mentioned on this forum, several km above sea level for all to see and be astounded by, the light, wind, wave, and fall out?
There must have been some logical arguments (documents or other evidence ?) why these options were actively rejected. A need to display US supremacy and to be the first to tout the nuclear muscle? Impressive but how to escape the moral responsibility arising for having fallen for the temptation for absolute power in the time's standards? Foregoing the moral argument, which can get messy just by mentioning it, what practical flaws in judgement were involved? Was there a clear set objective that precluded other options; perhaps "it serves the US interest to use the A-bomb"? If so, when was the decision made, and who knew?
I'm interested in how this argument can be countered on solid evidence, documents, memoirs, and witnesses. When given, how many of these can hold up under scrutiny, as veritable and genuine, and which ones rejected ascribed to unclear memory or self-rationalization?
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Sukotto
先輩
- 9 Jul 2003
- 1,426
- 20
We definitely should look into what the decision-makers
said via government documents as well as their personal
journals and biographies. What they state five years after the fact
may be the self-justification stuff. For example the save-body
count guess.
However, estimates of the hypothetical saved-body count, which range from 20,000 to 1.2 million, owe more to
political agendas than to objective projections.{5}
5. In June and July 1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff committees predicted
that between 20,000 and 46,000 Americans would die in the one or two
invasions for which they had drawn contingency plans. While still in
office, President Truman usually placed the number at about a quarter
of a million, but 1955 had doubled it to half a million. Winston
Churchill said the attacks had spared well over 1.2 million Allies.
(Barton Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-bombs," Los Angeles
Times, July 28, 1985, IV, p.1; Barton Bernstein, "Stimson, Conant, and
Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Diplomatic
History, Winter 1993, p.48.)
http://members.aol.com/essays6/abomb.htm
said via government documents as well as their personal
journals and biographies. What they state five years after the fact
may be the self-justification stuff. For example the save-body
count guess.
However, estimates of the hypothetical saved-body count, which range from 20,000 to 1.2 million, owe more to
political agendas than to objective projections.{5}
5. In June and July 1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff committees predicted
that between 20,000 and 46,000 Americans would die in the one or two
invasions for which they had drawn contingency plans. While still in
office, President Truman usually placed the number at about a quarter
of a million, but 1955 had doubled it to half a million. Winston
Churchill said the attacks had spared well over 1.2 million Allies.
(Barton Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-bombs," Los Angeles
Times, July 28, 1985, IV, p.1; Barton Bernstein, "Stimson, Conant, and
Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Diplomatic
History, Winter 1993, p.48.)
http://members.aol.com/essays6/abomb.htm
Sukotto
先輩
- 9 Jul 2003
- 1,426
- 20
Sr Pasta said:
I thought I read somewhere that the US had broken the Japanese code
about a year (or more) before Hiroshima and that they knew that Japan
was very worried about the emperor.
In "Atomic Diplomacy" Gar Alperovitz writes the use of the bomb was
to intimidate the Russians after the war. I may have posted this before?
Alperovitz writes that he did not plan to come to this conclusion,
but that he was merely researching what went into the decision
to use the bomb. There's nothing anti-american about trying to dig
up history. Is one "anti-american" if they point out the hypocracy
of George Washington and other "founding fathers" of the US continuing to hold others in bondage (slaves) and rhetoricing about freedom and liberty?
sabro
後輩
- 23 Apr 2004
- 1,006
- 35
Sir Pasta and Lexico- This is all guess work, and the morbid arithmatic of killing these thousands vs these thousands can go on and on and on. Even with the scant evidence I have seen, It is hard to get into the heads of Truman, Groves, Marshall, LeMay (see ATOMIC BOMB: DECISION (Hiroshima-Nagasaki)) and it is easy to second guess (would've, should've, could've)
It is also too easy to say the bomb ended the war and saved lives. You drop a couple of bombs, and Japan surrenders... there is definitely some kind of cause-effect relationship. Historians look at the battles of Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa and project casualty estimates based upon these. It is still a guess- but there is nothing to suggest in the fierce Japanese resistance, that hundreds of thousands, or even well over a million fewer deaths due to the war ending sooner is an extremely high estimate. Remember that massive firebombings were set to resume before an invasion and that full scale bombardment of Hokkaido was next. Shortages and hunger would be exacerbated by a prolonged blockade resulting in massive famine. There were other options, but all had consequences- some of which may have ended up costing significantly more lives.
Allowing the USSR to enter the war, and take not only Manchuria, but also as much real estate as possible also would have had consequences.
All of which is moot if Japan simply surrenders. Japan could have surrendered earlier in 1945, or better yet, withdrawn from China in 1941 and ended the strategic embargo.
I think this is a great discussion by the way. I find it probably one of the better reasons to study history- so that somehow we can avoid nuclear war.
It is also too easy to say the bomb ended the war and saved lives. You drop a couple of bombs, and Japan surrenders... there is definitely some kind of cause-effect relationship. Historians look at the battles of Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa and project casualty estimates based upon these. It is still a guess- but there is nothing to suggest in the fierce Japanese resistance, that hundreds of thousands, or even well over a million fewer deaths due to the war ending sooner is an extremely high estimate. Remember that massive firebombings were set to resume before an invasion and that full scale bombardment of Hokkaido was next. Shortages and hunger would be exacerbated by a prolonged blockade resulting in massive famine. There were other options, but all had consequences- some of which may have ended up costing significantly more lives.
Allowing the USSR to enter the war, and take not only Manchuria, but also as much real estate as possible also would have had consequences.
All of which is moot if Japan simply surrenders. Japan could have surrendered earlier in 1945, or better yet, withdrawn from China in 1941 and ended the strategic embargo.
I think this is a great discussion by the way. I find it probably one of the better reasons to study history- so that somehow we can avoid nuclear war.
It's not really hard to get into the heads of the members of the administration. One of the best books I have ever read is Melvyn Leffler's Preponderance of Power, an extremely detailed look into the Truman administration actions (its 600 pages long and in small type). It answers a lot of the questions.
That's false. A full-fledged invasion of the Japanese islands would have never happened by the Russians. They didn't have close to the technical capability for it (the Soviets had no surface navy to speak of), and it would most certainly have become a massacre that I doubt Stalin would have considered doing anyway. If he did, he would again be doing the dirty work for the western allies by expending soviet lives for the west as he thought he was doing on the Eastern Front vs Germany. The Soviet invasion was advantageous for two reasons for the US. #1 would remove the Kwantung army from existence, the best troops of the Imperial Japanese army, and fully isolate Japan from the rest of the world. It would no longer be able to rely on outside resources to continue the war effort. #2 it would politically isolate the Japanese, showing them that they were now completely alone. It showed to Japanese War Cabinet that there would be nothing but an unconditional surrender and that a third way was not possible.
Everything up to that point had shown that the Japanese were far from surrendering. Among the lessons in the forefront of American Leaders heads was the lessons of 1918... that getting a conditional surrender was not good enough, because the country in question may one day seek revenge as Germany did in 1939. (remember that Truman was an avid reader of history and himself a veteran of the first world war.) Japanese entries to the Russians were just seen as the 1918 armistice all over again, and unacceptable to all allied parties.
I don't think that would have any effect and was contrary to the time's thinking. It's pretty hard to understand the atomic bomb's raw power, and probably most people would not see its effects if it was dropped over the pacific. I don't think the world's most expensive fireworks show would have likely changed the leadership's mind. Given that the Japanese were using suicide attacks en masse, and had suffered far more grievous casualties in a shorter period of time than any other country involved in WW2, many doubted the Atomic bomb was going to stop the war. The only way to show its awesome effects was to use it on the populace. And since the Americans had already inflicted far more grievous damage via firebombing, the atomic bomb was the last card they could play. Nothing up to that point showed that the Japanese were willing for unconditional surrender and had no real idea about the War cabinet's divide.
Not really true. The Truman administration really didn't become fully worried about the USSR in a way to warrant the use of an atomic bomb until about February 1946. The Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in March 1946 was certainly a turning point, but the USSR's Refusal to pull back from Iran in that month was really the breakthrough because it was a clear abrogation of a previously held agreement. Before that point, Truman thought that if he gave the USSR straight talk, like when he first met Foreign Minister Molotov in late April 1945, they would do as they wished. Truman even thought that he could work with Stalin after meeting with him at Potsdam. And if that wasn't enough, Truman said that "the Russians needed the US more than the US needed the Russians."
The US supplied Russia with massive amounts of war material through the Lend-Lease program, such as trucks and tanks, vital for the war effort. At the end of the war, the US accounted for over 50% of the world's GDP. Also, it shows faulty logic that the Americans would be happy for the Soviet involvement in the war in the pacific (into a country with an active Communist Insurgency) then want to use the atomic bomb to scare the Russians into not interfering with the US sphere of influence.
Really the main concern at the time for the Administration was how to end the war in Japan as quickly and easily as possible. I'm sure a small part of the reason may have been the show the soviets, I can't possibly deny that it didn't enter into a part of the Deliberations, but it certainly was not even close to the main reason at all.
None of these is sufficient. First off, the US had an effective blockade running from about late 1944 onwards, and by April 1945 had actually run out of ships to sink. The silent service (the US submarine force) had essentially destroyed 90% of the Japanese merchant marine by the end of the war. Economic strangulation would achieve nothing. The airforce by July had the same problem. They had burned out almost every city out of existence except for five or so cities that had been purposely left untouched. And capitulation was still not forthcoming. Of course, both of these service chiefs, are going to push their option for ending the war because it would increase their prestige, and they would not have to incur heavy casualties. On the other hand, the Army did not want to go into Japan because they knew that they would get mauled heavily if they did so.
That's false. A full-fledged invasion of the Japanese islands would have never happened by the Russians. They didn't have close to the technical capability for it (the Soviets had no surface navy to speak of), and it would most certainly have become a massacre that I doubt Stalin would have considered doing anyway. If he did, he would again be doing the dirty work for the western allies by expending soviet lives for the west as he thought he was doing on the Eastern Front vs Germany. The Soviet invasion was advantageous for two reasons for the US. #1 would remove the Kwantung army from existence, the best troops of the Imperial Japanese army, and fully isolate Japan from the rest of the world. It would no longer be able to rely on outside resources to continue the war effort. #2 it would politically isolate the Japanese, showing them that they were now completely alone. It showed to Japanese War Cabinet that there would be nothing but an unconditional surrender and that a third way was not possible.
Everything up to that point had shown that the Japanese were far from surrendering. Among the lessons in the forefront of American Leaders heads was the lessons of 1918... that getting a conditional surrender was not good enough, because the country in question may one day seek revenge as Germany did in 1939. (remember that Truman was an avid reader of history and himself a veteran of the first world war.) Japanese entries to the Russians were just seen as the 1918 armistice all over again, and unacceptable to all allied parties.
I don't think that would have any effect and was contrary to the time's thinking. It's pretty hard to understand the atomic bomb's raw power, and probably most people would not see its effects if it was dropped over the pacific. I don't think the world's most expensive fireworks show would have likely changed the leadership's mind. Given that the Japanese were using suicide attacks en masse, and had suffered far more grievous casualties in a shorter period of time than any other country involved in WW2, many doubted the Atomic bomb was going to stop the war. The only way to show its awesome effects was to use it on the populace. And since the Americans had already inflicted far more grievous damage via firebombing, the atomic bomb was the last card they could play. Nothing up to that point showed that the Japanese were willing for unconditional surrender and had no real idea about the War cabinet's divide.
Not really true. The Truman administration really didn't become fully worried about the USSR in a way to warrant the use of an atomic bomb until about February 1946. The Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in March 1946 was certainly a turning point, but the USSR's Refusal to pull back from Iran in that month was really the breakthrough because it was a clear abrogation of a previously held agreement. Before that point, Truman thought that if he gave the USSR straight talk, like when he first met Foreign Minister Molotov in late April 1945, they would do as they wished. Truman even thought that he could work with Stalin after meeting with him at Potsdam. And if that wasn't enough, Truman said that "the Russians needed the US more than the US needed the Russians."
The US supplied Russia with massive amounts of war material through the Lend-Lease program, such as trucks and tanks, vital for the war effort. At the end of the war, the US accounted for over 50% of the world's GDP. Also, it shows faulty logic that the Americans would be happy for the Soviet involvement in the war in the pacific (into a country with an active Communist Insurgency) then want to use the atomic bomb to scare the Russians into not interfering with the US sphere of influence.
Really the main concern at the time for the Administration was how to end the war in Japan as quickly and easily as possible. I'm sure a small part of the reason may have been the show the soviets, I can't possibly deny that it didn't enter into a part of the Deliberations, but it certainly was not even close to the main reason at all.
None of these is sufficient. First off, the US had an effective blockade running from about late 1944 onwards, and by April 1945 had actually run out of ships to sink. The silent service (the US submarine force) had essentially destroyed 90% of the Japanese merchant marine by the end of the war. Economic strangulation would achieve nothing. The airforce by July had the same problem. They had burned out almost every city out of existence except for five or so cities that had been purposely left untouched. And capitulation was still not forthcoming. Of course, both of these service chiefs, are going to push their option for ending the war because it would increase their prestige, and they would not have to incur heavy casualties. On the other hand, the Army did not want to go into Japan because they knew that they would get mauled heavily if they did so.
Also remember that if the US was truly worried about the USSR, they probably wouldn't use their only two atomic bombs against Japan knowing that they wouldn't get the next one until a year later... it would make far more sense to keep one for later, then use it all on the russians. (but russia was not seen to be a short term threat anyway, as I have outlined above)
10almonds
先輩
- 26 Jun 2004
- 65
- 4
The atomic bomb of Nagasaki exploded above the Urakami Catholic Church that has a history of miserable martyrdom.
原爆資料室
http://www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/na-bomb/museum/exhibit/exhibit_b02.html
"500M from ground zero" has no meaning at all, inside the atomic bomb heat power.
Famous photographs in Hiroshima immediately after the atomic bombing
are the one after the town was cleaned.
We can not find out a body in the town at all. (in photographs of the town's scenery. )
Please look at these pictures.
平和記念資料館を見学_本館 市民が描いた原爆の絵
http://www.csi.ad.jp/ABOMB/RETAIN/burns3-j.html
原爆資料室
http://www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/na-bomb/museum/exhibit/exhibit_b02.html
"500M from ground zero" has no meaning at all, inside the atomic bomb heat power.
Famous photographs in Hiroshima immediately after the atomic bombing
are the one after the town was cleaned.
We can not find out a body in the town at all. (in photographs of the town's scenery. )
Please look at these pictures.
平和記念資料館を見学_本館 市民が描いた原爆の絵
http://www.csi.ad.jp/ABOMB/RETAIN/burns3-j.html
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lexico
後輩
- 22 Dec 2004
- 2,584
- 155
Thank you for sharing, Komachi.komachi said:
I was thinking more of 5,000 m above ground, AND near Tokyo, not in the middle of the Pacific, Noyhauser. That would have reduced the direct radiation impact to (1/10)^2 = 1/100 of what is was at 500 m above ground.
The infrared radiation (comparable to the radiation microwave ovens use for cooking, but perhaps 10,000 fold in intensity ?) would still have made the emperor's plants in his botanical garden go up in smoke; what a personal loss to the man !
But plants have no feelings, they have no relatives to mourn for them, they can regrow, although not the exact same plant. But humans... I don't know how Hiroshima bombing was different from the crematories at Auschwitz or those of Unit 731 near Ha'erbin. How were they different ? They were all essentially based on disregard for human lives which continues symbolically in the US historical views that there were no alternatives; that they were forced to do it; and that it was the wiser choice.
Yesterday I read in the papers about two recent polls in the US and Japan; while about 70% of US citizens believed a WWIII is in the future, while only about 30% of Japanese citizens believed so. A distorted perception of how the US ended WWII might be playing its little psychological trick here.
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