That's a big topic. Are you specifically looking between the wars? I think there's a lot of continuity going right back to the
Meiji Restoration.
Looked at strategically though, I think the First World War created an Asian power vacuum into which Japan would inevitably try to spread. Minimal fighting had given them Germany's Asian possessions, France and Britain were shell-shocked and Russia collapsed into civil war. Analyzing the war of economic exhaustion that had happened in Europe strengthened the sense that security required a directly controlled resource base.
It's also at this point that the seeds of the Pacific War are planted. It was largely US pressure that made Japan give up its puppet state in Vladivostok, and the 8/8 fleet expansion was funded to avoid having to back down in the future. Though the Washington Treaty headed off an arms race, influential elements in the Navy still came to view war against the US not in terms of "if" but "when."
War might have been avoided had Japan tried the Shidehara strategy of trying to reach a
modus vivendi with the West, meanwhile dominating Asia through more of a "soft power" approach. But as hard-line elements increasingly dominated the services and, through them, the government, the logic of those beliefs pushed Japan into being more adventurous and provocative rather than less.
You're right though, "Taisho Democracy" is the domestic context in which that decision was made. Any good sources you'd recommend?