THANKS to JAPANESE for giving a chance to chinese communist?
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bossel
後輩
- 28 Sep 2003
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I don't know if Mao really said this, but the statement as such is pretty close to the truth. When Japan attacked in 1937 the Communists were rather close to annihilation. But the Japanese attack forced the Chinese to face this threat together.
The losses suffered by the Chinese army against the Japanese & the fact that the communists were able to build up their forces again were major factors in the final defeat of the GMD.
The losses suffered by the Chinese army against the Japanese & the fact that the communists were able to build up their forces again were major factors in the final defeat of the GMD.
I would add some things but I don't have my books here.Care to give us any reasons El Che?
Well I just finished an essay for this in my elective history class... But before I post it, the Japanese did save the CCP from destruction. Had it not of been the outbreak of war in 1937, the Guomingdang would of crushed the communists in Yanan. But the Japanese did invade and Jiang Jieshi was force to shelve his plans, which gave time for the Communist party to rebuild enough to challenge the Nationalist party in 1946
Well I just finished an essay for this in my elective history class... But before I post it, the Japanese did save the CCP from destruction. Had it not of been the outbreak of war in 1937, the Guomingdang would of crushed the communists in Yanan. But the Japanese did invade and Jiang Jieshi was force to shelve his plans, which gave time for the Communist party to rebuild enough to challenge the Nationalist party in 1946
Explaining the outcomes of military conflict has had a long tradition. Its value for military planners is undeniable; if commanders have a better understanding of the variables involved in defeats or victories, they may be able to manipulate them to their advantage. Yet to do so successfully is a difficult task given the complexity involved in any armed conflict; it is often a variety of influences that may determine the outcome of any war. The Chinese communist victory is no different but two reoccurring dynamics seem to play a defining role in the outcome of the conflict, the management of resources and the tactics utilize in the war. This essay will contend that in both areas, critical errors by the Guomingdang that were manipulated by the Chinese Communist party caused the spectacular outcome of the war.
If victory was in warfare was solely determined by mobilization and utilization of resources, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have a definitive edge. At the outbreak of Civil War the Guomingdang enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in industrial capability and resources, as they controlled most of the affluent areas of China, including the costal regions and Manchuria. It also received massive military aid from the United States, which enhanced its gross advantage in resources over the CCP. But the Nationalist Party was unable exploit this situation because it presided over a corrupt economic system that siphoned the desperately needed war resources to special interest groups. These groups included regional governors, corrupt officials and landlords who possessed the necessary influence to manipulate government for their own ends and entrenched deeply enough so that they could not be removed. Foremost among these was the landlord class who was hostile to any plans that would change the status quo of their privileged economic position . What economic strength remained was further reduced by consecutive recessions and hyperinflation, which also had a detrimental effect on the both the civilian and military confidence in the government.
The Communist party mobilization compared starkly with the Guomingdang窶冱 policy, it supervised an efficient war economy. Even though it had little economic base, what resources the CCP did have were directed to their most efficient means. The CCP窶冱 success had much to do with its small size and coherence of its leader, where it could effectively organize and reorganize itself without much trouble. Since the CCP main policy was agrarian reform, it wiped out the parasitic landlord class in its territory and was able to devote those resources to the war effort. Secondly the CCP was far more consolidated than the Guomingdang and did not have to rely on corrupt administrators and warlords of dubious loyalty in distant regions to administer its forces. Many of the high offices of the CCP were staffed by survivors of the long march and who were committed to the communist cause. The adroitness of the CCP forces was an added advantage as to many in the populace they were viewed as liberators from the corrupt Nationalist forces.
In addition to economic mismanagement, the tactics employed by both sides also gave the CCP a marked edge. Because of its dominant position at the outset, the Guomingdang settled on a defensive strategy of protecting strategic areas from communist attack, pinning down much of its military strength in static positions. With fewer troops actively assailing it, the PLA had much more room to maneuver. Had the Guomingdang adopted a more proactive strategy at the outset it was likely they could at very least contain the CCP in the north, if not crush them outright. The PLA窶冱 tactics played to this tactical error, as the communist forces fought fluidly using the lessons learned from the Long March. They were willing to forfeit positions like Yanan when confronted by superior forces, only to attack weak spots in the Nationalist line with spectacular success. These attacks were quite successful capturing supplies and increasing the support for the CCP, which further demoralized nationalist troops and caused further defections.
Although this essay is intended to give an overview of some of the factors involved in the Guomingdang defeat, it by no means covers all the factors involved, only what may be considered the main ones. Both factors by individually have the potential to cause the collapse of the Guomingdang, but together they accelerated the process so that even the communists were stunned at the rate of their success. Had the Guomingdang corrected their strategies, if they were even able to, the outcome of the conflict may have been significantly different.
If victory was in warfare was solely determined by mobilization and utilization of resources, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have a definitive edge. At the outbreak of Civil War the Guomingdang enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in industrial capability and resources, as they controlled most of the affluent areas of China, including the costal regions and Manchuria. It also received massive military aid from the United States, which enhanced its gross advantage in resources over the CCP. But the Nationalist Party was unable exploit this situation because it presided over a corrupt economic system that siphoned the desperately needed war resources to special interest groups. These groups included regional governors, corrupt officials and landlords who possessed the necessary influence to manipulate government for their own ends and entrenched deeply enough so that they could not be removed. Foremost among these was the landlord class who was hostile to any plans that would change the status quo of their privileged economic position . What economic strength remained was further reduced by consecutive recessions and hyperinflation, which also had a detrimental effect on the both the civilian and military confidence in the government.
The Communist party mobilization compared starkly with the Guomingdang窶冱 policy, it supervised an efficient war economy. Even though it had little economic base, what resources the CCP did have were directed to their most efficient means. The CCP窶冱 success had much to do with its small size and coherence of its leader, where it could effectively organize and reorganize itself without much trouble. Since the CCP main policy was agrarian reform, it wiped out the parasitic landlord class in its territory and was able to devote those resources to the war effort. Secondly the CCP was far more consolidated than the Guomingdang and did not have to rely on corrupt administrators and warlords of dubious loyalty in distant regions to administer its forces. Many of the high offices of the CCP were staffed by survivors of the long march and who were committed to the communist cause. The adroitness of the CCP forces was an added advantage as to many in the populace they were viewed as liberators from the corrupt Nationalist forces.
In addition to economic mismanagement, the tactics employed by both sides also gave the CCP a marked edge. Because of its dominant position at the outset, the Guomingdang settled on a defensive strategy of protecting strategic areas from communist attack, pinning down much of its military strength in static positions. With fewer troops actively assailing it, the PLA had much more room to maneuver. Had the Guomingdang adopted a more proactive strategy at the outset it was likely they could at very least contain the CCP in the north, if not crush them outright. The PLA窶冱 tactics played to this tactical error, as the communist forces fought fluidly using the lessons learned from the Long March. They were willing to forfeit positions like Yanan when confronted by superior forces, only to attack weak spots in the Nationalist line with spectacular success. These attacks were quite successful capturing supplies and increasing the support for the CCP, which further demoralized nationalist troops and caused further defections.
Although this essay is intended to give an overview of some of the factors involved in the Guomingdang defeat, it by no means covers all the factors involved, only what may be considered the main ones. Both factors by individually have the potential to cause the collapse of the Guomingdang, but together they accelerated the process so that even the communists were stunned at the rate of their success. Had the Guomingdang corrected their strategies, if they were even able to, the outcome of the conflict may have been significantly different.
- 2 Nov 2003
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I've seen such comments of Chairman Mao Zedong and other VIPs on occation. but I think that "Japanese invaders" is not proper term and Japan Army is correct one.
and China Communist Army was pushed into close to annihilation by China Kuomintang Army, not Japan Army as of 1937.
for such occasions, China Communist Army wanted not to contend against China Kuomintang Army, and wanted China Kuomintang Army to contend against Japan Army. then China Communist Army made it come true that military conflict between Japan Army and China Kuomintang Army in Lu Gou Bridge Incident in 1937. antagonists Japna Army battled in China after that incident are mostly China Kuomintang Army and a little China Communist Army.
in result, both Janan Army and China Kuomintang Army were damaged, China Communist became to have the advantage. you know which the final subsequent winner is either Communist or Kuomintang in China.
I think that Chairman Mao Zedong said Japan Army helped China Communist Army on that reason which Japan Army weakened China Kuomintang Army.
I dont like Chairman Mao Zedong, because Japan was forced to have a warfare of which merit is much nothing for Japan due to him. but on the other hand, I think he is a sharp strategist in the military sense.
by the way, you, X_ﾂｹﾂｷﾃ暗祇X~HUNTER, had better never told around your companies my opinion in China, never! if you tell, you may attract the attention of authorities. you should keep it only inside of, regardless of whether you believe in my posting or not.
and China Communist Army was pushed into close to annihilation by China Kuomintang Army, not Japan Army as of 1937.
for such occasions, China Communist Army wanted not to contend against China Kuomintang Army, and wanted China Kuomintang Army to contend against Japan Army. then China Communist Army made it come true that military conflict between Japan Army and China Kuomintang Army in Lu Gou Bridge Incident in 1937. antagonists Japna Army battled in China after that incident are mostly China Kuomintang Army and a little China Communist Army.
in result, both Janan Army and China Kuomintang Army were damaged, China Communist became to have the advantage. you know which the final subsequent winner is either Communist or Kuomintang in China.
I think that Chairman Mao Zedong said Japan Army helped China Communist Army on that reason which Japan Army weakened China Kuomintang Army.
I dont like Chairman Mao Zedong, because Japan was forced to have a warfare of which merit is much nothing for Japan due to him. but on the other hand, I think he is a sharp strategist in the military sense.
by the way, you, X_ﾂｹﾂｷﾃ暗祇X~HUNTER, had better never told around your companies my opinion in China, never! if you tell, you may attract the attention of authorities. you should keep it only inside of, regardless of whether you believe in my posting or not.
- 15 Mar 2003
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Aren't both correct? It all comes down to what you want to imply. Japan invaded China, and so they can be considered invaders. This action was performed by the army and so you can say Japanese Army as well.
The shift comes in how you want to phrase it. If you say the Japanese army, to many it sounds like they gave active aid or support, possibly from Japan in the form of shipments, possibly from actions on the ground in active support of communist agendas.
If you say Japanese invaders, the wording now makes it sound that in no way were the Communists allied with the Japanese and were on the other side of the battle line. Now it look s like the communists were saved by indirect action (like keeping the Nationalists busy enough to recover etc).
Call it like it is. Japan invaded China and can be considered "invaders." This is much like the textbook wording issue some years ago of, if I recall correctly, "Japan advanced into Korea" vs. "Japan invaded Korea." Which puts Japan in a better light...?
- 2 Nov 2003
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after Lu Gou(Marco Polo) Bridge Incident, both Japan Army and China Kuomintang Army suspected what's what and negotiated a cease-fire at any rate.
howbeit local conflicts was still avoided, and Tong zhou Incident occured. it was that suddenly Japan presence military and Japanese civilian residents in Tong zhou, China(note; included Korean civilian residents. in that days, Korean is Japanese on the nationality.) was made particularly bloody murder like hard to say by China military wihtout military advice.
Japanese public opinion became indignant. nontheless Japan Gorvenment maintained nonexpansionist policy against China. (Tong zhou Incident was recompensed afterward.)
however local coflicts was repeated back-to-back. and Japan presence military was attacked on 13th August 1937. subsequetly China air arm dropped bombs International Settlement in Sanghai City on 14th August 1937. it was so-called 2nd Shanghai Incident(1937). Japan had the obligation protecting Jananese civilian residents in China. at this moments, Japan-China War(to be precise, Japan-China Incident) began as whole antagonism. therefore it was not the war of invasion.
as for Peal Harber, Japan was supposed to declare war against U.S.
half an hour before the attack of Peal Harber. but although it was not believed, Japan diplomats made a cataclysmic gaffe that they hung fire decoding the code of incoming call from Japan Government and typing it, and accordingly they handed in the message of declaration of war a hour and twenty minutes delay because of awaking late or hangover which was caused for the farewell party the day before.
so Japan prostrated itself and bows deeply in apology for the bad mistake but Japan did not have sneaky intent to attack. hate to say this, but I want you to understand only it.
both "Japan advanced into Korea" and "Japan invaded Korea." is wholly wrong. to be precise, Korea was made an annexation under an agreement between both nations, Japan and Korea lawfully.
howbeit local conflicts was still avoided, and Tong zhou Incident occured. it was that suddenly Japan presence military and Japanese civilian residents in Tong zhou, China(note; included Korean civilian residents. in that days, Korean is Japanese on the nationality.) was made particularly bloody murder like hard to say by China military wihtout military advice.
Japanese public opinion became indignant. nontheless Japan Gorvenment maintained nonexpansionist policy against China. (Tong zhou Incident was recompensed afterward.)
however local coflicts was repeated back-to-back. and Japan presence military was attacked on 13th August 1937. subsequetly China air arm dropped bombs International Settlement in Sanghai City on 14th August 1937. it was so-called 2nd Shanghai Incident(1937). Japan had the obligation protecting Jananese civilian residents in China. at this moments, Japan-China War(to be precise, Japan-China Incident) began as whole antagonism. therefore it was not the war of invasion.
as for Peal Harber, Japan was supposed to declare war against U.S.
half an hour before the attack of Peal Harber. but although it was not believed, Japan diplomats made a cataclysmic gaffe that they hung fire decoding the code of incoming call from Japan Government and typing it, and accordingly they handed in the message of declaration of war a hour and twenty minutes delay because of awaking late or hangover which was caused for the farewell party the day before.
so Japan prostrated itself and bows deeply in apology for the bad mistake but Japan did not have sneaky intent to attack. hate to say this, but I want you to understand only it.
both "Japan advanced into Korea" and "Japan invaded Korea." is wholly wrong. to be precise, Korea was made an annexation under an agreement between both nations, Japan and Korea lawfully.
bossel
後輩
- 28 Sep 2003
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Don't want to go into the details of your other flaws. Just one point about this one:
"New documentary discoveries suggest that the agreement of annexation was reached under duress; that the Korean rule, Kojong, did in fact protest the annexation; and that agreements reached prior to the 1910 annexation were similarly flawed. International law might now reach a finding, on this basis, that all of the events and actions during the 1910-1945 occupation of Korea were illegal, and Japan therefore does owe some form of compensation, if not an apology, for what happened."
from:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~korea/newsletter/newsletter81_011.html
shiroma
先輩
- 1 Mar 2004
- 481
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At least the first-generation communist rulers until 1980s knew that, because they were there surviving through the escape journey which they call Long March.heno heno moheji said:
The communist dynasty during 1990s chose to claim its legitimacy by posing that it was not KMT&USA but CCP that kicked out evil Japan, because the ideology was no longer the justification for one-party dictatorship when capitalism was introduced there. As a result, they needed to start chanting the mantra "Japan rewriting history" to defend their "new interpretation" of what happened, or a fantasy story to be more accurate.
Now they do not even remember that the red army was actually inland guerrilla/bandits:
President Bush and President Hu of People's Republic of China Participate in Arrival Ceremony
Their "struggle" unfortunately was not full-fledged land battles against Japanese army: the "famous" Hundred Regiments Offensive for instance was primarily railroad sabotage no matter how they try to beautify the tales.
It was the Nationalist party after all that United States aided during the second United Front, which somehow means "common struggle" to Hu and his fellows. The nation pressing their self-deception to the world not to mention the convinient amnesia about PLA's role in Korea and Vietnam, is treated by the US like this:
China Mistakenly Called by Taiwan's Name
